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and "mobilism," nowise suspecting that these traits may themselves be in large measure the result of prolonged political incapacity and of religious isolation whether compulsory or voluntary. His insistence on the inherited nature of special characteristics such as lack of concrete imagery in the Jew, his undervaluation of (abstraction from) personality, liberalism in politics, and rationalism in economics, seem scarcely warranted in view of current biological theory. Moreover, the abundance of evidence that might be adduced in support of the very opposite traits leads one irresistibly to suspect that there are many obstinate facts in Jewish life and character that are not dreamed of in Sombart's neat schematology. For this reason, his conclusions bear some of the marks of a closet-philosophy—the inevitable result of an attempt to comprehend reality by an examination of documents, to know the life of a people through a literal reading of its law. It is to be expected that the author's subsequent investigations in this field will supply the lack of realistic grasp which mars this otherwise masterful and original work.

PAUL WANDER

Introduction à la sociologie. Par GUILLAUME DEGREEF. New edition. Paris: Marcel Rivière et Cie, 1911. Tome I, pp. c+230, Tome II, pp. 444. Unbound, Fr. 12.

The new edition of this celebrated work is enriched by a long preface, devoted mainly to discussion of Comte, Quetelet, and Spencer. Professor DeGreef avers that his own theories, even when inconsistent with theirs, are nevertheless developed from those of the three great founders named.

The preface contains a number of interesting remarks on the subject of education. These are quite in harmony with the discussion of that subject contained in the main text; indeed there is nothing in the preface to indicate the slightest diminution of confidence in any of the author's characteristic teachings, or any desire to modify or qualify them, but rather stout reaffirmation. He holds that democracy involves two things: a just distribution of wealth and a just distribution of intelligence, which implies instruction for all up to the limit of their capacity. Primary and secondary instruction, he says, are too theoretical and separate from practice; while, on the other hand, the higher instruction is too occupational and specialized. Every well-educated person, he believes, should have a general notion of all the divisions of science enumerated in Comte's

hierarchy. And he adds that "No student should issue from the university without having followed a complete course in sociology. Lawyers, physicians, and engineers can be men, that is to say intelligent members of society, only upon this condition." Only proper instruction can lay the foundation for the reconciliation of classes and the future progress of society.

The main text of the first volume of the work is devoted to a statement of the task of sociology, a definition of its method, an argument to show that after the existing development of biology and psychology, sociology necessarily forms the next step in the progress of science, a statement of the distinguishing characteristics of the new science, and a classification of the phenomena with which it deals.

The conceptions of DeGreef are very closely related to those that were held by sociologists before the abandonment of the most literal application of the biological analogy. His objects of study are the huge political aggregates that have so often been spoken of as social organisms. He calls them "superorganic," and regards them as standing above the organisms described by biology and psychology, because of their greater complexity and the hierarchic arrangement of their parts. Proof of the necessity of the additional science of sociology, he thinks, is afforded by a description of these superorganic aggregates, or societies, which brings out the differences that distinguish them from the objects studied by anterior sciences. Accordingly he points out at length the differences between a society and a biological organism. Twelve differences are enumerated, culminating in the individual consciousness and independent will of the members of society. This last necessitates the mutual consent of the units composing the aggregate, a fact the like of which is nowhere else in nature. This mutual consent, or contract, is the specific social phenomenon.

Tyranny, slavery, or serfdom therefore does not constitute society. Social aggregates so organized are only nascent superorganisms; yet even they are not wholly devoid of the element of mutual consent. The state is not an independent entity but is a creation of society, or rather, according to his use of the words, the state is society; and political science, properly so called, is a science of the direction of the social will.

According to Professor DeGreef social phenomena are of seven kinds: (1) economic; (2) geneseic; (3) artistic; (4) those relating to beliefs; (5) moral; (6) juridical; (7) political. It is his claim that this enumeration begins with the simplest and proceeds at each step with increasing complexity and decreasing generality, the last being the most

complex and specially adapted and restricted of all. The contractual element, he declares, becomes more prominent the higher we go in this hierarchy of social phenomena, and societies advance in proportion as they perfect their contractual bond.

This classification, with corresponding subdivisions under each main head, is the crux of his system, and he believes that no rational politics, that is, no rational action of society upon itself, is possible without the guidance which it affords. This doctrine is re-emphasized in the new preface in these words: "The strife of social classes can terminate in an established social order only when men recognize and accede to the natural order implied in the hierarchical nature of the social facts themselves. This recognition and assent, and this alone, could furnish us a positive science of politics, which is the goal of sociology." The importance attached to electoral systems, parliamentary debates, and changes in the personnel of government, he regards as ridiculous. He has a truly Gallic estimate of the practical importance of a theoretical speculation.

In discussing economic activities, which he regards as the lowest, simplest, and most universal of social activities, he says that barter is the primordial conscious social activity; that consumption is the next step in the hierarchy of social activity, consumption which is simpler and more universal than exchange, being in reality not a social activity at all, but biological; and that production is last of all the economic activities to become socialized.

He claims that each system of social organs, economic, genesic, artistic, intellectual, moral, juridical, political, grows directly out of those which had preceded it, except of course the economic, which is the direct and necessary outcome of that presocial basis, consisting of territory and population. Moreover, each system of social organs reacts upon and modifies and controls all social activities of lower or anterior type. At the two extremes of this series of interrelations stand the economic activities, as basic determinants of the whole social structure, and political action, the highest of all and finally dominating all the rest. This being his view, one cannot be surprised to find him saying that empiricism, digging down from its beginnings at the very surface of things, and socialism, rising gradually from its profound hypothesis toward the visible and actual, have met and united in scientific socialism or sociology (!); "the union between socialism and positive science is now an accomplished fact."

Religion, he says, produces morality and then morality kills religion. The social function of religion, he believes, is to serve as a temporary

means of regulating the antecedent social organs, economic, genesic, and artistic, supplying provisionally the inadequacy of science and of the juridical and political organs, which are the last to be fully developed (II, 189, 190).

He comes very near to anticipating Professor Sumner's distinction between "folkways" and "mores," if indeed he does not exactly do so. "The passage of simple usages," he says, "into custom, and of custom into law, properly so called, likewise marks the transition from the unconscious to the conscious" (II, 423). If all the members of a population seek food, comfort, sociability, and glory, pursuing individual motives without "contractually" adopting methods of co-operation, their actions are "reflex and instinctive," and become socially conscious, or expressions of social intelligence, only when designed, or at least adopted by, deliberate public opinion or authority.

With all its excellences one can but regard this work as representing, in several respects, a passing stage of sociological development, in that it depends so much upon biological analogies, though without carrying them to the extreme of literalism, in that its conception of society is so political, any other conception of society being barely mentioned and not utilized because having no real place in the system, and in that "social forces" and similar collective abstractions are the causes suggested for the social phenomena, and glittering generality occupies the place of analytic explanatory description. Yet the system is so beautiful in its intricate self-consistency that one shrinks from endangering the symmetrical fabric by submitting it to too harsh contact with incongruous facts.

EDWARD C. HAYES

Histoire de la Polynésie orientale. Parts A C. EUGÈNE CAILLOT.
Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1910. Pp. 606.

This is the second of a series of works devoted to eastern Polynesia. The first volume, entitled *Les Polynésiens orientaux au contact de la civilisation*, was published in 1910; a third volume, *Les origines des Polynésiens*, is in process of preparation. When M. Caillot completes his trilogy, he will have performed a most useful service in bringing together the very scattered literature which deals with the origin and history of the Polynesian race.

The author confines himself strictly to the eastern half of the Pacific world. In fact, the bulk of his work is devoted to the Society Archi-